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Abstract: This study investigates the factors that may affect whether foreigners invest in a firm. A panel data set of 2,413
firm-year observations of listed firms at the Amman Stock Exchange was analyzed from 2002 to 2019. The results show that
foreigners prefer to invest in large firms that have a dividends policy, a high-quality governance system and external auditing.
Local institutional ownership and governmental ownership are found to be insignificantly associated with foreign investment.
More interestingly, these results are reported after controlling for possible confounding events that are most likely to affect
foreigners’ decisions. Specifically, foreign investment is found to have been negatively affected by the global financial crisis
(2007 to 2009). This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that each capital market has its own features,
thus the generalizability of the findings, even between developing countries, is questionable.
Keywords: Foreign Investment, Amman Stock Exchange.

1. Introduction
Foreign investment is essential to the economic growth of
any country. Therefore, Jordan has established an attractive
environment for investment by enhancing the institutional
and legislative environment to promote foreign investment
[1]. For example, in 1997 Securities Law No. 22 was issued
and emerged out three institutions – i.e., the Amman Stock
Exchange (ASE), the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC)
and the Securities Depository Centre (SDC) – to regulate
the capital market in Jordan. In 2001, the government
adopted a programme of economic transformation to
enhance the role of the private sector in the economy and
institutionalise a partnership between the public and the
private sectors. Furthermore, in 2009 the JSC enacted a
corporate governance code to enhance the transparency
and accountability of listed companies’ financial reporting.
It seems that these procedures have paid off, as the figures
indicate a rise in foreign investment to reach 51.5% of ASE
capitalisation in May 2021 [2]; this reflects the ability of
ASE to attract foreign investment, due to the good
investment and economic environment in Jordan [3, 4].
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Foreign investment brings many benefits to the local
economy, which are reflected in economic growth and a
reduction in unemployment rates, and even an
enhancement of the investment environment itself. [5] have
claimed that foreign investments enhance employment
opportunities and develop the financial sector. Similarly,
[6] argued that foreign ownership can enhance corporate
governance practices by playing a significant role in
expanding growth opportunities and enhancing the value
of firms.
This study aims to delve into the factors that may affect the
decision of foreign investors to invest in listed Jordanian
companies; this can be done by exploring foreign
investors’ preferences when they invested in companies.
Moreover, the literature shows important factors that may
attract foreign investment; for example, [4] found that
foreign investments in Jordan are more likely to be directed
to large companies with a low dividend yield. Additionally,
[7] found a strong relationship between the operations of
foreign banks and the governance levels of countries.
Correspondingly, [8] established that companies with good
governance attracted more foreign investors, regardless of
their country-level protection environments of investment.
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2. Review of the Literature
2.1 Local Institutional ownership and Foreign
Ownership
Several factors may play a key role in enhancing the
sustained development of any market. The institutional
environment is a major player in encouraging foreign
investors to transfer their investments to such host
countries [1]. Indeed, well-developed and diverse markets
are expected to be attractive investment targets to foreign
investments seekers [9]. In this regard, [10] finds that
emerging markets were more manageable and preferred by
foreign investors as a result of the diversity of the
ownership map; specifically, the presence of institutional
owners. In the same vein, [11] points to the noticeable role
of institutional owners in increasing the percentage of
foreign owners, since the former are seen as
knowledgeable and experienced players in the map of firm
ownership. Furthermore, [12] finds that the multinational
corporations are more inclined to direct their investments
towards firms which have a diverse ownership map (i.e.,
institutional owners).
Therefore, the presence of institutional owners acts as a
trustworthy signal for local and foreign investors who are
looking for safe investment channels to maximise their
wealth [1]. Such investors have been classified as superior
investment-hosting environments, since they are expected
to have the upper hand in overseeing and controlling firms’
activities, specifically their investments. Thus, the
following hypothesis can be formulated:
H1: There is a positive association between institutional
ownership and foreign ownership.

2.2 Firm Size and Foreign Ownership
Firm size is another crucial factor which may appear as an
attractive variable in hosting foreign investors in local
markets. Large firms are classified as strong and stable
destinations for investments, since such firms have
superior levels of technology, management skills and, most
importantly, monitoring mechanisms [13]. The monitoring
mechanisms developed by large firms serve to entice
foreign investors. In addition, [14] reports that larger firms
are less sophisticated in accepting foreign investments,
since such firms have the required experience and capital
to achieve the expectations of foreign investors.
Additionally, [15] shows the importance of firm size as one
of the main conditions to enhance a firm’s performance in
which such a relationship will establish a solid investment
ground for foreign investors within the Vietnamese
environment.
To sum up, larger firms have been introduced as
experienced and skilled players in enhancing firms’
© 2022 NSP
Natural Sciences Publishing Cor.

A. Abu Haija et al.: Determinants of Foreign Investment in…

performance and their financial positions. This may create
an incentive for foreign investors to direct their
investments to large firms, since the necessary
infrastructure is available, and the management skills are
also available to protect their investments. Hence, the
following hypothesis can be formulated:
H2: There is a positive association between firm size and
foreign ownership.

2.3 Governmental Ownership and Foreign
Ownership
The ownership map plays a key role as a monitoring
mechanism in overseeing management activities,
guaranteeing a stable investment environment for internal
and external investors [1, 16]. Governmental ownership
has been introduced as a valid monitoring tool, by means
of which they are expected to constrain any unfavourable
decisions undertaken by management. Indeed, they have
functioned as active owners in enhancing the financial
position of investee firms. In this regard, [17] demonstrates
the key role of state-ownership in enhancing the financial
position of firms, proposing that such firms are considered
an attractive destination for foreign investment.
Some researchers, however, find that the existence of
governmental ownership may not lead to an increased level
of foreign owners. For instance, [18] found that stateowned firms were less attractive for foreign investors
wishing to create smooth investment channels.
Additionally, the state-owned firms have a greater
tendency to make risky decisions in comparison with other
types of owners. Such a conclusion reduces the probability
of hosting foreign investors in such firms. Taken together,
there is no general consensus on the potential association
between governmental ownership and the decision of
foreigners to invest in a firm. Nonetheless, the current
study formulates the following hypothesis:
H3: There is a positive association between governmental
ownership and foreign ownership.

2.4 Dividends Policy and Foreign Ownership
The distribution of dividends is one of the most crucial
financial decisions a firm makes, because it is most likely
to ensure the firm’s long-term existence [19]. Agency
theory argues that dividends can be used as a mechanism
to alleviate agency problems in a firm by reducing cash
flow, which in turn gives managers less potential to utilise
free cash for their own benefit [20, 21, 22]. Moreover,
signalling theory proposes that changes in dividend policy
transmit information about changes in future cash flows
[23. 24]. Owing to the information asymmetry between
managers and investors, especially foreigners, managers
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use dividend changes as a signalling tool to convey their
expectations about the firm’s future growth.
Previous studies [25, 26, 27] have examined the
relationship between foreign ownership and dividend
payments. For example, [28] finds that investors exert
more pressure on firms to pay high dividends to
compensate them for the extra risk caused by greater
informational asymmetry. In the same vein, [29], using a
sample of Pakistani firms, find that foreign investors are
forced to increase cash dividends. By contrast, [30] reports
that foreign ownership is associated with lower level of
dividends, suggesting that foreigners prefer reserving their
profits for future growth. This result is also reported by
examples of research in different contexts, such as those
conducted by [23, 19, 31]. To conclude, the debate about
the potential link between foreign ownership and dividends
policy is still open, especially with the global changes in
economic, social and political circumstances due to
financial crises (e.g., the one that occurred in 2007), wars
(e.g., what happened in Iraq, Libya, and Syria) and
pandemics (such as Covid-19, which started in 2019).
Hence, the following hypothesis can be suggested:
H4: There is a positive association between dividends
policy and foreign ownership.

2.5 Corporate Governance Code Policy and
Foreign Ownership
Financial globalisation has opened up equity markets for
foreign investors and motivated them to move from
developed to emerging markets. As a result, these
emerging economies have experienced accelerated growth
[32], because foreigners have a substantial amount of
capital and adequate capabilities, along with their role in
improving liquidity and the inflow of foreign currency,
which in turn boosts the economic growth of a country
[33]. It is essential, therefore, to determine the factors that
actually persuade foreign investors to invest in a particular
capital market [34]. Corollary to this, promoting corporate
governance practices is perceived to be an essential tool to
alleviate the agency problem arising from the separation
between owners and managers [21]. Hence, foreign
investors are most likely to be attracted to firms that have
strong governance structures [35]. Since 1997, the
Jordanian government has taken a number of steps to
amend the corporate governance regime in the country.
One of the speciﬁc objectives of Jordan’s reformation has
been a strong governance system, in order to safeguard the
rights of investors [36].
Very limited studies have been conducted regarding the
association between corporate governance and foreign
investment. For instance, [37] reveal that board
independence and ownership structure do not play a role in
attracting foreign investment in the Saudi capital market.
This result shows that foreigners do not attach ample
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significance to board governance and their investment
decisions. The same result was also reported by [38]. In a
similar vein, [34] has investigated the impact of board
characteristics on foreign investment in the context of
Bangladesh. The result reveals that there is a significant
negative influence of board size on foreign investment, due
to the fact that foreigners may associate smaller board size
with more tenacious and effective decision-making. This
result is consistent with [39, 40], who demonstrate that the
board’s ﬁnancial expertise positively affects foreigners’
decisions. Based on the previous discussion, the following
hypothesis can be developed:
H5: There is a positive association between the corporate
governance code and foreign

2.6 Audit Quality and Foreign Ownership
The Jordanian government considers attracting foreign
investors a priority, due to the country’s bounded natural
resources [1]. Since that time, several laws have been
enacted by the government designed to create a proper
environment for attracting investors, which in turn
improves the economic growth of the country [41]. A
considerable literature proves that external audit acts as a
monitoring mechanism which is supposed to diminish the
agency costs arising from managers’ self-serving
behaviour [42]. Therefore, the quality of external auditors,
especially those from the established international firms,
can play a vital role in monitoring, by improving the quality
of financial statements and helping foreigners with their
investment decisions [43, 44]. Owing to this, managers
demand a high quality of auditing, which includes a rigid
audit with a proper degree of professional scepticism,
conducted in compliance with the applicable standards.
A very limited number of studies, however, have been
conducted regarding the association between audit quality
and foreign investment. For example, [45] have found that
firms with a high level of foreign ownership generally have
to obtain a higher quality of auditing to alleviate conﬂicts
of interest. Furthermore, [46] point out that foreign
investors are more likely to demand a high quality of audit
to safeguard their investment from manipulation. [47]
however, indicates that there is an insignificant relationship
between audit quality and foreign investment. Based on the
previous discussion, it is clear that there is no general
agreement about the association between audit quality and
foreign investment. Nonetheless, the current study expects
that firms with high-quality auditing are more attractive to
foreigners; hence, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H6: There is a positive association between audit quality
and foreign ownership.

© 2022 NSP
Digital Commons.
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3. Methodologies
3.1 Sample Selection and Variables Measurements
To determine the most important factors that motivate
foreigners to invest in Jordanian firms, a comprehensive
investigation is conducted using data from firms listed on
the ASE from 2002 to 2019. All sectors are included in the
sample, because there are no restrictions or special
requirements imposed by the government pertaining to
foreign ownership in any one sector. Table 1 shows that the
listed firms for the period covered generated 2,822 firmyear observations. Some financial data, however, are not
available for 225 observations, thus they are excluded.
Additionally, 514 observations are excluded from the
sample as their ownership structure is not disclosed in the
firms’ annual reports, especially in the early years of their
trading on the ASE. After all exclusions, this study
comprises 2,083 firm-year observations. The financial data
as well as ownership structure data were collected
manually from annual reports, which took approximately
four months11
Table 1: Sample selection criteria
Description

Number
of
observations
3,152

Listed firms on the ASE from 2002
to 2019
Lacking: missing financial data
(225)
Lacking:
missing
ownership
(514)
structure data
Final sample
2,413
This study uses the percentage of stocks owned by
foreigners to the total number of a firm’s stocks to measure
foreign ownership (FOR.OWN). Independent variables
include firm size (SIZE) measured by total assets at the end
of a firm’s year. Local institutional ownership
(LOCAL.INST) is measured by the percentage of stocks
owned by local institutions to the total number of a firm’s
stocks. Government ownership (GOV.OWN) is measured
by the percentage of stocks owned by the Jordanian
government to the total number of a firm’s stocks.
Dividends (DIVIDENDS) are measured using a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the firm distributed
dividends, and zero otherwise. Governance quality (CGC)
is measured using a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the firm year relates to the period 2009 to 2019, and
zero otherwise. Audit quality (AUD.QUA) is measured
using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
firm is audited by one of the big-4 auditors, and zero
otherwise.

11

Firms’ annuals reports are available online
at:https://jsc.gov.jo/Disclousre.aspx
© 2022 NSP
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The study also controls for some factors that may have an
impact on the association between firms’ attributes and
foreign ownership. The factors include loss (LOSS), which
is measured using a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the firm has reported negative earnings, and zero
otherwise. Firm age (AGE) is measured by the length of
time since a firm’s establishment. Global financial crisis
(GFC) is measured using a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the firm year is 2008 or 2009, and zero
otherwise. Table 2 specifies the variables and their
measurement. To test this study’s hypotheses, the
following regression equation is used:
𝐹𝑂𝑅. 𝑂𝑊𝑁'( = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸'( + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇'(
+ 𝛽8 𝐺𝑂𝑉. 𝑂𝑊𝑁'( + 𝛽; 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆'(
+ 𝛽= 𝐶𝐺𝐶'( + 𝛽> 𝐴𝑈𝐷. 𝑄𝑈𝐴'(
+ 𝛽A 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆'( + 𝛽B 𝐴𝐺𝐸'( + 𝛽C 𝐺𝐹𝐶'(
+ 𝜀'(
Table 2: Summary of variables and their measurement
Description
Dependent variable:
FOR.OWN
Independent
variables:
SIZE

Variable name
Foreign ownership

Firm size

Measurement
The percentage of stocks
owned by foreigners to the
total number of a firm’s stocks.
The total assets at the end of a
firm’s year.

Exp. sign

+

LOCAL.INST

Local institutional
ownership

The percentage of stocks
owned by local institutions to
the total number of a firm’s
stocks.

+

GOV.OWN

Government
ownership

The percentage of stocks
owned by the Jordanian
government to the total number
of a firm’s stocks.

_

DIVIDENDS

Dividen
ds

A dummy variable that takes
the value of one if the firm
distributed dividends, and zero
otherwise.

+

CGC

Corporate governance A dummy variable that takes
code
the value of one if the firm year
relates to the period 2009 to
2019, and zero otherwise.

AUD.QUA

Audit quality

A dummy variable that takes
the value of one if the firm is
audited by one of the big-4
auditors, and zero otherwise.
A dummy variable that takes
the value of one if the firm is
reported negative earnings, and
zero otherwise.

+

+

Control variables:
LOSS

Loss

AGE

Firm age

The time length of a firm
establishment.

+

GFC

Global financial
crisis

A dummy variable that takes
the value of one if the firm year
is 2008 or 2009, and zero
otherwise.

?

_
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4. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3: Pearson test
(1)
FOR.O
WN
SIZE
LOCA
L.INST

(1)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1.000

(2)

1.000
0.200

(3)

*

-0.046*

1.000

0.033

0.140*

-0.068*

1.000

(5)

0.020

-0.125*

0.064*

0.111*

1.000

(6)

0.052

0.032

-0.020

-0.003

-0.073*

1.000

0.267

0.034

0.148

0.111

0.141*

1.000

*

GOV.O
WN

(4)

DIVID
ENDS
CGC

(2)

0.149
*

*

AUD.Q
UA
LOSS
AGE

(7)

0.284

*

*

*

*

(8)

0.031

-0.156

-0.041

-0.106

-0.520

0.103

-0.130*

1.000

(9)

0.046

0.183*

0.060*

0.210*

0.332*

0.020

0.212*

-0.206*

1.000

-0.016

-0.004

-0.008

-0.008

-0.203*

0.019

-0.010

-0.070*

*

*

*

*

GFC

(10
)

0.025

Notes: this table illustrates Pearson test of listed firms on the ASE from 2002 to 2019.The symbol (*) denotes significance
at 5 percent in two-tailed test. All variables are defined previously in table 2.

Table 3 describes the variables of firms listed on the ASE
from 2002 to 2019. The mean of foreign ownership
(FOR.OWN) is 16.6 percent. Notwithstanding that, the
market value of these stocks is ranged between 37 percent
and 51 percent out of the total market value of all stocks on
the ASE from 2002 to 2019. This relatively high market
value indicates that Jordan has an attractive environment
for foreign investments, most likely owing to the political
stability as well as the absence of barriers to foreign
investment in all sectors of the ASE. Indeed, the statistics
show that some firms are totally owned by foreigners (i.e.,
the maximum percentage of their ownership is 99 percent).
By contrast, some firms do not have stocks owned by
foreigners as the minimum percentage is zero.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the current study’s
variables
Variables

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Median

SD

FOR.OWN

0.000

0.990

0.166

0.005

0.248

SIZE
(in
millions)
LOCAL.INST

0.234

7227

171.5

225.0

57.80

0.000

0.973

0.262

0.190

0.453

GOV.OWN

0.000

0.999

0.037

0.000

0.106

DIVIDENDS

0.000

1.000

0.454

0.000

0.498

CGC

0.000

1.000

0.720

1.000

0.449

AUD.QUA

0.000

1.000

0.379

0.000

0.485

LOSS

0.000

1.000

0.323

0.000

0.467

AGE

1.000

81.00

25.05

20.00

19.64

GFC

0.000

1.000

0.152

0.000

0.359

Notes: this table illustrates the variables of firms listed on the ASE from
2002 to 2019. All variables were defined previously, in Table 2.
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It seems that the average size of Jordanian firms is
relatively low (the mean is approximately 171 million),
especially when compared with other stock markets in
both developed and developing countries [see, for
example,48, 49]. While the average of stocks owned by
local institutional investors (LOCAL.INST) is reported at
26.2 percent, the mean value recorded for government
ownership (GOV.OWN) is only 3.7 percent. This implies
that policymakers in Jordan have succeeded in their effort
to privatise the capital market and moved the ownership
of the majority of stocks on the ASE to the private sector.
Indeed, government ownership decreased from 15 percent
in 2002 (as reported by the ASE) to 3 percent in 2019, as
indicated in Table 3. This significant reduction is
considered one of the most important outcomes of
‘Privatisation Law No. 25,’ which was issued in 2000 to
organise the privatisation process in the Jordanian
business environment.
While the statistics show that 45.4 percent of firms
distributed dividends (DIVIDENDS) to their
shareholders, only 37.9 percent of listed firms are audited
(AUD.QUA) by one of the big-4 auditors (i.e.,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte and
KPMG). On average, 32.3 percent of firms reporting
negative earnings as (LOSS) appeared in Table 3. This
indicates that some firms listed on the ASE are facing
financial difficulties, which in turn may minimise their
attractiveness to foreign investment. Although the Amman
Financial Market was created in 1976 (this name was
changed in 1999 to the ASE), the mean value recorded for
firm age (AGE) is approximately 25 years, suggesting that
some Jordanian firms are still developing and that they lack
the experience to make themselves more attractive,
especially to foreigners. Other variables – namely,
governance quality (CGC) and the global financial crisis
(GFC) – are not discussed here, because no meaningful
statistics can be analysed.
5. Findings
The starting point pertaining to regression analysis is to
check several assumptions, namely multicollinearity,
normality, serial correlation and homoscedasticity. Some
researchers, like [50] and [51], argue that multicollinearity
starts to create concern regarding a regression’s results
when the correlation between two variables is 70 percent
and more. The Pearson test, therefore, is used here to check
whether the data have the multicollinearity problem. Table
4 shows that the highest correlation exists between
dividends and loss (coefficient is -0.520). This negative
correlation is highly expected, because conventional
wisdom argues that when a firm reports a loss in a specific
financial period, it is less likely to distribute dividends. A
relatively high positive correlation also appears between
dividends and age (coefficient is 0.332). This is consistent
with the view in the literature that the oldest firms have
more experience, compared with newly listed firms, thus
© 2022 NSP
Digital Commons.
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they are more able to generate positive earnings and
distribute dividends to their shareholders. To conclude, the
current study’s variables do not suffer from
multicollinearity.
After checking other assumptions, the results reveal that
the data are not normally distributed and that they suffer
from heteroscedasticity. To overcome this, the present
study follows the methodology adopted by [51] who
employs robust standard errors. The fixed effect model
(FEM) is used here to investigate the determinants of
foreign investments in firms listed on the ASE.
Furthermore, the random effect model (REM) is used to
make the findings robust.
Table 5 reports the results of FEM with robust standard
errors of the association between firms’ attributes and
foreign ownership. Firm size (SIZE) is found to be
positively and significantly associated with foreign
ownership (coefficient = 3.320 and p< 0.05), suggesting
that large firms are more attractive to foreigners. Indeed,
previous research, like that of [52] , documents how those
large firms have a high-quality board of directors, in terms
of including more independent and expert directors, which
in turn leads to more control over managers’ decisions, thus
shareholders’ interests are best served by those managers.
Furthermore, investors in large firms are less likely to
suffer from the problem of information asymmetry, as
those firms disclose the relevant information on a regular
basis. Therefore, foreigners are hesitant about investing in
small firms. Based on this conclusion, H1 is supported.
Table 5: Results of FEM of the association between firms’
attributes and foreign ownership.
Hypothesis

Variable

H1

SIZE

+

H2

LOCAL.INST

+

-0.010*

H3

GOV.OWN

-

-0.023

H4

DIVIDENDS

+

0.017**

Accepted

H5

CGC

+

0.014**

Accepted

H6

AUD.QUA

+

0.023

-

LOSS

-

-0.002

-

-

AGE

+

-0.001

-

-

GFC

?

-0.012*

-

Adjusted R2
F-value
P-value

Predicted
sign

Coefficient
3.320**

***

Result
Accepted
Not
accepted
Not
accepted

Accepted

11.20
4.070
0.000

Notes: this table presents the results of FEM with robust standard errors
of the association between firms’ attributes and foreign ownership. The
sample comprises of firms listed on the ASE from 2002 to 2019. The
dependent variable is foreign ownership. Independent and control
variables were defined previously, in Table 2.
The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10, 5 and 1
percent, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
© 2022 NSP
Natural Sciences Publishing Cor.

Inconsistent with the current study’s proposition, local
institutional investors (LOCAL.INST) are found to be
negatively associated with foreign ownership (coefficient
= -0.010and p< 0.10). This indicates that foreigners avoid
investing in firms where most stocks are owned by local
institutional investors. This conclusion contradicts the
view in the literature, such as in [53, 54], that the existence
of institutional investors is considered a good sign
pertaining to the quality of firms’ financial reporting. One
possible justification of this result is that foreigners,
especially in developing countries, try to protect their
investments by avoiding buying stocks in firms where the
problem of information asymmetry, as well as the control
of shareholders, may exist. Thus, H2 is rejected. In this line
of thinking, foreigners are less likely to invest in firms
where the government (GOV.OWN) appears in firms’
ownership structures, as shown in Table 5. While the
association between them is statistically insignificant, the
negative sign of the coefficient is consistent with the
predicted sign. The low percentage of government
ownership in firms listed on the ASE (the mean is
approximately 4 percent) may stand behind this
insignificant association. Based on this conclusion, H3 is
rejected.
This study proposes that firms that distribute dividends to
their shareholders are more attractive to foreigners. The
results in Table 5 support this proposition and report a
positive and significant association between dividends
(DIVIDENDS) and foreign ownership (coefficient = 0.017
and p< 0.05). This is consistent with the findings of
previous studies in different contexts, like [55], that
foreigners prefer such firms because it is considered a good
indicator about their profitability, especially for the long
run. Therefore, H4 is supported. There is universal
agreement in the literature that the presence of a highquality governance system is considered a good sign
pertaining to a firm’s financial performance and its
profitability. The results of the current study are in line with
this argument, with a positive and significant association
being found between the implementation of the corporate
governance code (CGC) and foreign ownership
(coefficient = 0.014 and p< 0.05). Thus, foreigners are less
likely to invest in firms that suffer from a weak governance
system, especially when foreigners have the required skills,
as well as the financial resources, to determine such firms.
It seems that the strict requirements included in the CGC
(i.e., stating a strict definition of an independent director,
prohibiting a dual leadership structure, and determining the
minimum and maximum when it comes to board size) exert
more pressure on firms’ managers to direct their decisions
to maximizing shareholders’ interests instead of their own
benefit. Hence, H5 is supported.
Finally, Table 5 reports a strong positive association
between audit quality (AUD.QUA) and the fraction of
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stocks owned by foreign investors (coefficient = 0.023 and
p< 0.01), suggesting that hiring one of the big-4 auditors to
audit firms’ financial reports is considered a good sign
pertaining to the quality of their reported earnings. This is
because such auditors have a breadth of knowledge that
may help them in detecting the problematic decisions and
activities that do not align with stockholders’ interests.
Regarding control variables, only the global financial
crises (GFC) have a positive relationship with foreign
ownership. A possible explanation for this result is that
during the crisis period foreigners’ move towards investing
in safe financial markets (i.e., Jordan) as they are less
affected by the GFC compared with other markets,
especially in developed countries.

6. Discussions
One of the most crucial decisions facing foreign investors
is to determine the appropriate firms as well as context to
invest in. This is because each context has its own features
in terms of ownership structure, capital market regulations
and governance quality. This study, therefore, examines
the potential factors that may affect foreigners’ decisions
to invest in a firm or not. This has been done using a panel
data set of 2,413 firm-year observations of firms listed on
the Amman Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2019. The
results show a statistically significant association between
firm size and foreign ownership, indicating that large firms
are more attractive to foreigners, most likely because such
firms have effective monitoring mechanisms, either
internal or external.
Dividends are also found to be positively and significantly
associated with foreigners’ investing preferences. Highquality governance as well as external auditing are
considered important factors when foreigners decide to
invest in a firm or not. This is most likely because such
factors reflect the quality of a firm’s financial reporting.
Other factors – namely, local institutional ownership and
governance ownership – are found to be insignificantly
associated with foreign ownership. This study contributes
to the literature by providing evidence that capital markets
have their own features, thus each market must be
examined separately to determine the potential factors that
may affect foreigners’ investment decisions.

7. Recommendations
This study recommends the following recommendations
based on the results found over the study sample. Indeed,
regulators and stockholders should concentrate on
enhancing the monitoring role for both institutional
ownership and governmental ownership in order to present
such owners as committed owners in which they can attract
foreign owners to invest in Jordanian firms. In addition,
regulators should regulate several regulations which
facilitate the flow of foreign investment to the Jordanian
market since such market is classified as a scarce market in
terms if its financial and natural resources.
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